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This article is devoted to the attempt of the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) to 
create a new fur trading empire in Eastern Siberia and Kamchatka during and after 
the Civil War (1919–1925). It was one of the most controversial and substantial 
attempts by a foreign company to do business in Soviet Russia, and therefore is a 
unique case study for understanding the relationship between the young USSR 
and foreign business. The Kamchatka expedition is often understood as a case 
of the HBC’s naïve and poor judgment of the political risks involved. However, 
this article argues for a broader understanding of the expedition, one that takes 
into account specific business strategies, geo-economic Arctic developments, and 
the historical conditions in which trade in the area had unfolded in the decades 
leading up to the First World War. Concerning the last point, American traders 
based in Nome and Alaska had successfully traded in the Kamchatka area and set 
up a system in which they provided supplies to native and Russian communities 
in the Far East in return for furs (either by barter or for legal tender). Importantly, 
the system made inhabitants of the area dependent upon these supplies. The 
HBC’s endeavor in Kamchatka was an attempt to take over and continue these 
lucrative operations, but it also suited its expansionist business strategy elsewhere. 
From the early twentieth century, the HBC had been setting up new trade posts 
in the Canadian Arctic in a response to suffocating competition in mainland 
Canada. As such, the Kamchatka operation seemed like a logical extension of this 
expansionist strategy. In addition, doing business in the high north led private 
business to form specific expectations: state presence in the area was feeble, 
regardless of its political allegiance. The article, then, explores the fortunes of the 
company in Siberia. It shows that the company easily adapted to local conditions 
by successfully contracting local middlemen. It also shows that the difficulties of 
operating in the area were not only caused by underestimation of the political 
risks, but also because the company suffered from enormous logistical problems: 
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it also had trouble adapting to the environmental circumstances, despite its 
experience in remote territories. The eventual restoration of territorial integrity 
initially brought about cooperation between the USSR and the HBC, illustrating 
that the USSR was aware of the pressing need to supply the area, even though 
such a policy was at odds with the state monopoly on trade. The cooperation 
ended with the withdrawal of the HBC, as it considered trade conditions too 
unpredictable.
Keywords: Russian civil war; fur trade; Kamchatka; trade monopoly; Soviet 
foreign trade; Arctic; business and war.
Статья посвящена попытке Компании Гудзонова залива (КГЗ) создать но-
вую империю по торговле пушниной в Восточной Сибири и на Камчатке 
во время и после Гражданской войны (1919–1925). Это была одна из самых 
серьезных и противоречивых попыток иностранных компаний вести дела 
в советской России, и, в связи с этим, она представляет большой интерес, 
так как проливает свет на  отношения молодого советского государства 
и иностранных предпринимателей. Камчатская экспедиция часто тракту-
ется как пример наивного и неглубокого представления КГЗ о возможных 
политических рисках. Однако автор статьи настаивает на более широком 
взгляде на  экспедицию с  учетом специфики ведения дел, геоэкономиче-
ских особенностей Арктики и исторических событий, в которых развива-
лась торговля в регионе в десятилетия, предшествующие Первой мировой 
войне. Американские торговцы из  Нома и  Аляски успешно вели дела 
на Камчатке. Им удалось создать систему, благодаря которой они обменива-
ли товары, необходимые коренному и русскому населению Дальнего Восто-
ка, на меха (по принципу бартера или за валюту). Важно отметить, что эта 
система сделала местных жителей зависимыми от иностранных поставок. 
КГЗ хотела перенять этот опыт на Камчатке, так как подобное взаимодей-
ствие представлялось чрезвычайно выгодным, и, кроме прочего, вписыва-
лось в стратегии экспансии компании. С наступлением XX в. КГЗ начала 
создавать новые торговые посты на канадских арктических территориях 
в качестве альтернативы таковым в континентальной Канаде, где конку-
ренция была слишком высока. Торговое освоение Камчатки в этой связи 
выглядело логичным в  рамках дальнейшей экспансии компании. Кроме 
того, ведение дел на Дальнем Севере привело к формированию у частных 
предпринимателей особых ожиданий, связанных с этой территорией: го-
сударственное присутствие там было минимальным, несмотря на  поли-
тическую лояльность региона власти. Настоящая статья посвящена дея-
тельности компании в Сибири. Показано, что КГЗ легко адаптировалась 
в регионе, наняв местных посредников, а сложности ведения дел там были 
связаны не  только с  недооцениванием политических рисков, но  также 
с тем, что компания испытывала серьезные логистические проблемы в су-
ровом дальневосточном климате, несмотря на имеющийся опыт торговли 
на  Севере. Восстановление территориальной целостности первоначаль-
но привело к  сотрудничеству СССР и  КГЗ, что свидетельствовало о  по-
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нимании СССР необходимости обеспечения региона товарами, однако 
такая политика шла вразрез с государственной монополией на торговлю. 
Сотрудничество закончилось уходом КГЗ из СССР, так как компания счи-
тала условия торговли непредсказуемыми.
Ключевые слова: Гражданская война в России; торговля пушниной; Камчат-
ка; торговая монополия; международная торговля СССР; Арктика; пред-
принимательство и война.
War has vast consequences for international business. It seals off foreign 
markets and supplies, but can also sometimes provide unexpected oppor-
tunities. This was particularly the case of the First World War and Russia. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, Russia had become one of the most 
attractive outlets for international businesses. Between 1880 and 1913, 
over 50 % of all capital invested in industrial corporations was of foreign 
origin [Dunning, Lundan, p. 172]. French, German and Belgian business-
es gained a strong foothold, and many trading businesses organised the 
export of Russian raw materials abroad. The war drastically changed the 
conditions for international business in Russia. First, German businesses 
lost their assets, since such was considered to be property belonging to the 
citizens of an enemy state. In 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution threatened 
the presence and activities of all foreign enterprises. Nonetheless, many 
businesses still considered the revolution and its chaotic aftermath to be 
an opportunity. This was especially the case in regions east of the Urals, 
outside Soviet control during the Civil War. Indeed, the Allied military 
occupation of the eastern area of Siberia was predicated upon the hope 
of re-establishing trade interests and obtaining concessions with regards 
to Siberia’s mineral wealth. Such motives undergirded British business in 
particular: its ineffectiveness in establishing a strong trade interest in this 
part of the world before the war constituted a painful lacuna [Davenport-
Hines, Jones, p. 80]. While these economic aspirations in post-revolu-
tionary Russia would remain a pipe dream, several attempts to set up new 
business empires did take place. One of the most important, controversial 
and long-standing ventures was the Hudson’s Bay Company’s Kamchatka 
expedition, a fruitless but serious attempt to control the furs of Eastern 
Siberia and the Kamchatka Peninsula during the Civil War and after. The 
venture started in 1919 and ended in 1924, when the HBC, the largest fur 
trading company in the world, officially decided to withdraw. In this lim-
ited time, however, the company managed to set up a trading operation of 
considerable magnitude, based on supplying the area with foodstuffs and 
consumables in return for the fur wealth of Kamchatka. This article is de-
voted to this Kamchatka venture in an effort to better understand how in-
ternational businesses functioned during the post-revolutionary war and 
their motivations for taking advantage of this chaos. Equally, I consider 
how the USSR finally came to manage business intrusion in those parts of 
the country that were remote and difficult to control.
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The historical literature on the HBC Kamchatka expedition in the 1920s 
remains limited and has somewhat indulged in the benefit of hindsight. Most 
explanations point, correctly, to the company’s poor assessment of the very 
risky political situation [Dalton, 2006]. Bockstoce talks of the “optimistic” 
and even “naïve” assumption of the HBC that the territorial power of the 
Soviet Union would not extend to the remoter parts of the Asian coast 
and Kamchatka as the company’s main rationale [Bockstoce, p. 126]. Such 
explanations are rather problematic, as they are prone to condemning, rather 
than explaining, the attempts of foreign companies to operate in the Soviet 
Union during the Civil War. In contrast, this article is built on the argument 
that the Kamchatka fiasco needs to be understood in terms wider than the 
political risks; it also has to be set against the canvas of shifts in the global 
fur trade in general and the HBC’s renewed business strategies in particular.
Gradually losing its monopoly over the trade in mainland Canada 
throughout the 19th century, one of the HBC’s main efforts to maintain 
its leading position in the global fur trade was to seek new frontier territory 
in which it could establish trade activities. The HBC therefore turned to 
new frontier territories in the high north, such as the Canadian Arctic 
[Declercq]. The stage of expansion was both the Eastern Arctic (north 
of the Hudson Bay towards Baffin Island) and the Western Arctic (towards 
the Beaufort Sea) [Newman, p. 246]. As such, a reinvigorated wave 
of expansion based on fur trading took place during the early twentieth 
century. This expansion led to new connections, especially between Alaska 
and the Chukotski Peninsula, but there were also growing links between 
Siberia and Canada in the years leading to the war, based upon Russia’s 
desire to populate Siberia and the economic development of Canada’s 
territories on the Pacific. Such connections and visions of future trade 
relations were of fundamental importance, as Black has argued, to Canada’s 
policy of intervention during the Civil War [Black, p. 26–27].
In stressing the economic foundation behind Canada’s military 
intervention, it becomes clear that the interest of the HBC in Siberia was 
not an isolated case of shortsightedness; instead, it unfolded in a context 
in which other stakeholders saw the potential of transpacific trade and 
investments in post-revolutionary Russia, regardless of the conflict’s 
political outcome. As such, the hypothesis of this paper is that the brief 
expedition in Kamchatka should be read on a longer and larger temporal 
and spatial canvas as part of a renewed wave of expansion in the fur trade 
that relied on growing economic interconnections between North America 
and the Russian Far East before the First World War. This is not to deny 
that the HBC did indeed painfully underestimate the political risks, but 
one should also stipulate that the Kamchatka venture was part and parcel 
of the HBC’s aspirations to establish a new fur trade empire with a center 
of gravity closer to the recently explored Arctic areas of the globe. As part 
of this strategy, the company was willing to take risks and adopt long-
term perspectives when developing new trade territory. These factors, it is 
hypothesized, blinded the HBC to the many obvious political risks involved.
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Signaling opportunities (1916–1921)
The HBC’s interest in doing business in Russia’s Far East began long 
before the October Revolution in 1917. The initial expression of interest 
in Siberia was strongly connected to the desire of the British authorities to 
strengthen their feeble presence in the area at the expense of the Germans. It 
was the Foreign Office that took an interest in the sequestration of German 
businesses during the war, especially the Kunst & Albers trading house 
in Vladivostok. The Kunst and Albers merchant house, founded by two 
Hamburg traders in 1864, was a major stronghold of German commerce in 
the Russian Far East, being the market leader in wholesaling and retailing 
in the area. In the fur trade, however, the Vladivostok company played only 
a minor role. The commercial intelligence service of the Foreign Office 
stressed the similarity in organizational structure to the HBC: “the Kunst & 
Albers concern resembles very closely in the Far East the trading operations 
of the Hudson’s bay Company in Canada, possessing large distribution 
depots and retail stores at the chief centers of population in Eastern Siberia” 
[TNA. BH 1/2215. A 12FTMISC/250. F. 2–3].
The only reason the Russian government was attracted to the take-over 
was the ability of the HBC to continue trading operations, which illustrates 
the “extreme state of dependency of the Siberian population” on supplies 
shipped in from abroad [Murby, р. 73]. However, the HBC’s logistics, 
fleet, and organizational structure were at that time strongly tied to the 
war effort (especially in terms of provisioning the Allies and organizing 
their supplies), meaning that it was unable to “attend to an extension of 
this magnitude in Russia” [TNA. BH 1/2215. A 12FTMISC/250. F. 4–5]. 
Even though the HBC refused to take over the Kunst & Albers concern, 
its interest in Russia during the war expanded. It ran a shipping business 
in Arkhangel’sk from 1915 to 1919. In 1919, the HBC also participated 
in the Siberian Supply Company, which was designed to sell goods from 
the British government in Siberia [Black, p. 14].
The fur trade fitted the scheme of British and Canadian officials 
to expand their commercial presence in the area, as buying furs in remoter 
areas typically went along with delivering supplies, such as foodstuffs, 
ammunition and alcohol: “It struck me that if the Hudson’s Bay Company 
could come in and start fur trading it would supply an additional means of 
exchange which would be very valuable. Firstly, the Company if it followed 
the usual lines, would no doubt get rid of a lot of goods by the direct process 
of barter of furs. Then, so far as it required money for local expenditure, 
it would supply an additional fund for the purchase of Canadian or 
British goods” [TNA. BH 1/3452. A.93/12. F. 12]. Still, the HBC remained 
remarkably hesitant to carry the burden of such an operation entirely on 
its own: “the organization of the fur trade in Canada is unique, and we do 
not know whether we will be fitted to engage in competition for a business 
which has developed upon such entirely different lines.” [TNA. BH 1/2603. 
A5/129. F. 223]. Instead, the board chose a safer route to the fur wealth 
of the Far East.
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In 1919, the HBC entered a joint venture set up between a trader by 
the name of Count Berg and Sale & Frazar, a British and American trading 
and engineering firm that operated in Japan [Shavit, p. 174]. The HBC 
became the main shareholder with 60 % of the shares. The partnership was 
informally known as the Trio Account, but it was officially registered as the 
Kamchatka Fur Trade Company. At this stage, the HBC was not directly 
involved in local commercial activities, and trading goods were purchased 
principally from the warehouses of Sale & Frazar in Tokyo. While it was 
difficult to establish new trade posts owing to distrust towards foreigners, 
the Kamchatka Fur Trade Company primarily operated with local Russian 
traders and staff scattered over 15 trading posts to secure furs.
It was already during the Trio Account that the trade partners, 
in particular Count Berg, asked for greater involvement from the HBC. 
For instance, shipments in 1920 were brought in by Japanese steamers, 
with representatives who knew too little of the fur trade [TNA. BH 
1/2633. A 92/17/21. F. 26]. Count Berg asked whether a HBC ship could 
be deployed in the area, along with experts in grading and valuing 
Kamchatka furs. By this point, however, the HBC had already been 
seriously contemplating a larger, more direct role in the Siberian trade. 
The motivation for this was not simply exploiting the power vacuum. 
It was also taken from a specific business point of view that was tied 
to the historical development of the fur trade in North America in 
recent decades. When the HBC board contemplated in 1920 the difficult 
matter of how deeply the company should be involved in the Siberian 
trade, HBC traders stressed that the opening of a direct Siberian coastal 
trade constituted a logical extension of existing HBC operations 
in the Canadian Western Arctic. Provisions to these northern areas were 
primarily procured in Vancouver and Nome in Alaska. Much of the trade 
in the area had already organized in a transpacific fashion for decades, with 
American traders like Hibbard & Swenson operating from Seattle since 
1902, bartering and trading along the Siberian coast. In Nome, Alaska, 
local traders were similarly enthusiastic about accelerating the exploitation 
of the Alaskan and Siberian Arctic during the Civil War [Hunt, ch. 6].
With its Western Arctic operations expanding, the HBC could 
participate in this profitable trade and compete with the Alaskan-based 
traders. Norman Freakley, a HBC captain active in the Western Arctic, 
saw that HBC ships could easily serve both Herschel Island and parts 
of the Siberian coast. He therefore recommended a more direct approach 
and “to set up regular trade posts along the Siberian coast, similar to 
these existing on the Hudson Straits” [TNA. BH 1/2623. A 92/17/6. F. 78]. 
Freakley emphasized that fur trading operations could profit because 
of the chaos in the area: “owing to the unsettled state of the country”, supplies 
were urgently needed [Ibid.]. In addition, the fortunes of competitors were 
evaluated, in particularly the loss of a schooner by Hibbart & Swenson, 
a trading company with a strong presence in the area: this was seen as an 
extra opportunity that worked to the advantage of the HBC.
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Indeed, from such a geo-economic perspective, setting up trade activities 
in Siberia does seem more like a ‘natural’ extension of intensifying trade 
activities in the transpacific north rather than the exploitation of a windfall 
opportunity. Moreover, one should not underestimate the extent to which 
Arctic exploitation and exploration was the subject of wishful thinking at the 
time. Arctic space, remote, barely explored and sparsely inhabited, was very 
much seen by contemporaries as open and vacant land, the last blank space 
on Earth where formal sovereignty was often not carved in stone. This applied 
to the Russian Far East as well. For instance, the sovereignty of Wrangell 
Island in the Chuckchi Sea was disputed, as American expeditions tried 
to lay claim to it. In terms of the wider Chuckchi Peninsula, north of Anadyr, 
the HBC noted that the presence of American traders operating from Nome 
(Alaska) was much stronger than any formal Russian presence and that 
Russian authority in the region “was so slight” [TNA. BH 1/2634. A 92/17/25. 
F. 179–184]. In large parts of the area where the HBC wanted to trade, Russian 
authority was indeed insignificant, leaving much leeway to individual traders. 
As such, the HBC’s entry into the fur trade in Siberia involved many other 
factors besides a simple misjudgment of the political risks. In large parts of the 
territory, government interference was largely absent, regardless of who was in 
power. The company highly favored such “free”, frontier-like conditions: they 
also underlay the expansion into the Canadian Arctic, where state interference 
was virtually absent as well [Declercq].
Setting up shop (1921–1923)
At the beginning of 1921, the Kamchatka Fur Company was dissolved 
when Count Berg and Sale and Frazar withdrew. At this point, the HBC took 
the unfortunate decision to continue alone, however, at this moment such 
seemed like a logical continuation of its previous efforts. In organizing the 
trade on its own account, the HBC continued to service the basic system 
of trade posts used by the Trio Account. Amongst company administrators, 
there was mounting confidence that their investments were eventually going 
to pay off: a number of new settlements and posts were integrated into the 
system. By 1923, the company commanded a network of over 25 trade posts, 
extending from Port Ayan on the south-western coast of the Okhotsk Sea 
to Cape North in the Russian Arctic. This covered a coastline of over 3,500 
miles, connected to inland transport routes (rivers, tracks) totaling over 700 
miles [TNA. BH 1/2702. A 92/30/1. F. 161]. Trade posts were situated on both 
sides of the Kamchatka Peninsula, on the Sea of Okhotsk and a long stretch 
on the Bering Sea, opposite Alaska towards the Bering Strait. In Olyutorsky 
district, the port town of Anadyr figured as the headquarters of the HBC’s 
operations. Even further north along the Chutchi Sea, a post was established 
at the Chukotsk River. Further south, significant posts were situated at the 
mouth of the Uka and Kamchatka rivers [TNA. BH 1/2628. A 92/8/1. F. 46]. 
The HBC’s main site in the southern area was the port of Petropavolvsk, 
strategically situated almost at the southern end of the peninsula [Ibid. F. 44]. 
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Next to the peninsula itself, the HBC called at ports on Eastern Siberia’s 
coastline along the Sea of Okhotsk, like Chukotsk and Ayan.
The trade infrastructure varied considerably. Some settlements did have 
substantial warehouse infrastructure to safely store supplies and furs for sale. 
This was the case in Okhotsk, a proper town with government buildings, 
a wireless station and substantial log houses situated on the Siberian 
mainland. In other places, by now mostly abandoned, new infrastructure 
was created by the company itself. This was the case in the port of Ayan, 
where a new storage area was established. While Ayan was already remote 
and hard to service, some places, especially on the peninsula itself, lacked 
warehouse and port infrastructure. A telling example is Olyutorka, where 
the HBC’s Russian representative Arteymnoff had made most of the material 
available and had created a store out of “dunnage, earth and corrugated 
iron” [TNA. BH 1/2628. A 92/8/1. F. 15].
The lack of knowledge about local markets previously holding the 
company back from direct operations in the area was solved in two ways. 
First of all, the HBC hired the Dutch trader Anton Hoogendijk to manage 
the Kamchatka expedition: he was given a large degree of autonomy. 
Hoogendijk, a Russian-speaking go-between based in Arkhangel’sk with 
whom the company had been in business during the war, established the 
majority of posts on the coast of Kamchatka that bordered the Bering Sea: 
ships could easily reach this area from the port in Vancouver. Secondly, 
while the trading posts in Canada were controlled by their own staff 
(so-called post managers), the HBC in the Russian Far East continued 
to outsource control over posts to local traders, just like under the Trio 
Account. One of the main trading partners was the Russian trade firm the 
Karieff Brothers, with an operating base in Anadyr. The Karieff brothers 
were granted extensive credit of $ 150,000 in order to conduct the fur trade 
on behalf of the company [Ibid. F. 42].
Besides the Russian go-betweens, however, the way in which trade 
functioned resembled the way the HBC operated in Canada. Hunters and 
trappers, chiefly natives, brought the furs to HBC stores, from where these 
fur suppliers received provisions such as foodstuffs, weapons, ammunition 
and alcohol [Ray, p. 2]. The Russian middlemen assumed the function 
of “storekeepers”, drawing in furs and distributing HBC supplies shipped 
in during the ice-free season across these vast regions [Ibid. F. 21]. This 
is how the fur trade historically worked on frontiers, especially in North 
America. The trading of furs for supplies was also the basis of the trade 
on the remote Kamchatka Peninsula established by American traders in 
the late 19th century. It made local people, natives or settlers, dependent 
on the post for supplies and foreign suppliers [Yarzuktkina, р. 377]. This 
supply function was key to the trade in the remote parts of Kamchatka 
and Eastern Siberia, and made goods like furs a valuable exchange 
commodity to the traders who supplied the area. Marchenko, a Russian 
representative of the HBC, noted that “the need of all kinds of goods by 
the people is great. They need everything, but have no means of buying 
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the goods. If anyone has any fur he tries not to trade it for merchandise 
and usually is hiding all he has for fear he will be relieved of it” 
[Ibid. F. 35]. As such, the need for supplies in exchange for furs formed 
the basis of trading in this era.
Command of the seasons: force majeure  
and political instability
While the operation made general sense in terms of the customary 
principles of fur trading, and those of the HBC in particular, in practice the 
HBC was confronted with numerous complications. To service the remote 
Russian posts and to bring the furs back, the HBC deployed one of its most 
important vessels, the Baychimo, in the Kamchatka area. In addition, a 
number of smaller trade vessels, mostly from Japan, were chartered to call 
at other trade posts. Nature, however, did not cooperate: it became clear 
that the scale which the HBC intended for its Siberian business was far 
too ambitious. In 1922, Anton Hoogendijk painted a negative picture of 
the Kamchatka expedition in his report to the company’s governor and 
committee. Particularly harsh conditions during the summer had troubled 
supply ships. The summer ice melted relatively late and had coincided 
with hostile weather conditions such as heavy gales and fog, which made 
it impossible to provide all trade stations with the necessary provisions and 
caused considerable delay. These were harshest summer conditions since 
the Russo-Japanese War. In one trade post in Okhotsk, the ice disappeared 
five weeks later than usual. The port of Ola was only cleared of ice 
on 30 June, whereas it could normally be reached in the first week of June 
[Ibid. F. 50]. Due to icy conditions, the Baychimo was unable to call at some 
of the northernmost posts of the Chukotsk Peninsula, like North Cape and 
Pylgin, on the turf of the Karieff Brothers [Ibid. F. 13]. To make matters 
worse, the Baychimo sustained heavy damage when it got stuck in shallow 
waters.
These kind of logistical problems were commonplace in the region: 
confronted with the unusual summer conditions, Hoogendijk had to admit 
that the company had started on a “too extensive programme, without 
sufficient preparation in advance” [Ibid. F. 64]. The logistical problems 
of other companies added to the chaos. In the summer of 1921, a crew 
of Japanese fishermen was not retrieved from Kamchatka in time, and 
so was left without food and suitable clothing for the winter. The crew 
raided the HBC post at Khadirka, allegedly murdering five company 
employees. Before a Japanese warship picked them up, the fishermen also 
attacked a Russian rescue party. The raid caused considerable damage 
to the operation, with a loss amounting to $ 9,500 [TNA. BH 1/2702. 
A 92/28/2. F. 4–5]. In addition, the HBC feared an essential loss of “prestige 
in the area”, and therefore threw all its energy, and its connections with the 
Foreign Office, into getting the Japanese government to repay the damages. 
Problems also stemmed from working with chartered vessels. During the 
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summer of 1922, HBC agents were confronted with the mutinying crew of 
the Koyo Maru. Under threat of violence, they were forced to give the sailors 
a 60 % increase to their pay. The difficulties of organizing the logistics of 
expansion were not an issue solely confined to Kamchatka. In supplying the 
Western Arctic, such forms of cooperation also created problems, which is 
one reason why the HBC ordered the construction of a new schooner for 
its Western Arctic operations in Canada.
Next to the logistical problems and the violence, competition was 
another disturbing factor, in particular from the American firms who had 
a strong foothold in the area. The Seattle-based fur trader Olaf Swenson, 
who was already active in Siberia before World War I, operated with some 
schooners in the area, and also had contractors disturbing the trade in the 
HBC district of the Kamchatka River [TNA. BH 1/2629. A 92/8/6. F. 9]. 
In addition to Swenson, two American firms, Wulfsohn & Co and Seidenverg 
& Wittenberg, a Russian company and a Japanese trading business were 
active in the seas of the Far East [TNA. BH 1/2628. A 92/8/1. F. 24]. There 
was an intricate link between competition and the ability to procure 
supplies in the region. A multitude of suppliers undermined the model, as 
it increased the ability of local traders to source supplies and sell to multiple 
channels. In 1921, the HBC trade post and small settlement of Tigil could 
drive prices up due to the activities of Swenson in the area. The following 
year, the HBC was unable to call at the post due to fog and coal shortage, 
which again put Swenson in a strong position. In Bolshetersk, hunters went 
to sell their furs directly in Petropavlovsk, which drove up prices for sable 
skins [Ibid. F. 67]. Hoogendijk mentioned the high prices for sable, driven 
up by competition, as one of the largest risks to future trading operations. 
The HBC had particularly underestimated the competition from Swenson, 
whose long-standing interest in the area was bolstered in 1922 by fresh 
capital. The HBC came to the conclusion that the peninsula was not large 
enough for both concerns to operate. In the autumn of 1922, contacts 
were established between the two companies in order to make future 
arrangements for the exploitation of Kamchatka.
Other than setting the conditions for calling at remote trade posts, 
nature also influenced levels of competition. The entry of the HBC 
coalesced with declining yields of sable hunting in the Kamchatka 
Peninsula, which added to the intensity of competition. Further north 
in the Chukotsk Peninsula, a particularly harsh winter meant that the 
natives were preoccupied with saving their reindeer herds rather than 
hunting white foxes [Ibid. F. 13].
Another fundamental misjudgment was political. The Far East was the 
scene of various struggles between the Whites and the Reds, the outcomes of 
which were often hard to follow. For instance, merchants in Anadyr, unable 
to cope with communist ideas about economic organization, killed the 
members of the first Soviet Revkom in January 1919: they established their 
own local governing organ whilst also pretending to form a cooperative to 
the Kamchatka Revkom [Gray, р. 90]. In August of the same year, however, 
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the Soviets reconquered Anadyr, but it did not seem to affect the Karieff 
Brothers [Nutall, p. 87]. Between 1920 and 1922, the territory in which the 
company operated was formally under the control of the Far East Republic 
(FER), a Soviet puppet state designed to act as a buffer between occupied 
territory and the USSR, which but temporally ended the effort to restore its 
territorial integrity [Wood, p. 187]. The situation remained however chaotic, 
with different factions struggling for power. Settlements under revolutionary 
control, certainly in the remoter parts, were often based on tiny and primitive 
party cells with little or no central oversight [Cannon, p. 21]. Equally, White 
warlords could not guarantee ideal trading conditions. Trade reports in 1922 
describe the Whites in the Okhotsk area as nothing more than freebooters 
and the White general as a “brigand”. Indeed, the company’s expeditions were 
provided with extra money to bribe local officials.
Despite the grim political and economic prospects, the Dutch leader of 
the expedition Hoogendijk followed an ambitious course of action. During 
the summer of 1922, HBC agents on board the supply ships established 
new posts on the Kamchatka Peninsula, in Ayan, Uka and further north. 
Again, this all depended upon finding local Russian partners with the 
right qualifications. For Uka, the HBC hired a trader called Ofshanikoff. 
Ofshanikoff had been in the service of Tchurin & Co for twelve years: 
this was a trading company active in Pacific seal hunting. Given his 
experience in the fur trade and contacts with the local population, 
this figure was considered a major future asset: “He has considerable 
influence among the native population in his district and it is therefore 
good business and competitors from outside will be handicapped as long 
as he remains in the service of the company” [TNA. BH 1/2628. A 92/8/1. 
F. 24]. In addition to the new posts, Hoogendijk also renewed and 
improved existing agreements during that summer with local traders. 
This was the case for the most important partner, the Karieff Brothers 
from Anadyr, whom Hoogendijk tried to tie more closely to the HBC 
by offering a 10-year exclusivity contract (with an exit penalty of 
$  25,000) [Ibid. F. 20]. The renewed contract also relieved some 
of the HBC’s obligations that were hard to maintain, foremost 
the provision of some of the northernmost posts.
From expedition to fiasco (1923–1925)
Not long after the HBC had established a new trade post in the summer 
of 1922, the Japanese gave up Vladivostok in October. In December 1922, 
the Far East Republic was incorporated into the USSR, and White control 
over the Kamchatka coastline finally came to an end. How did the HBC 
perceive the end of the Civil War in favor of the Soviets? The company 
was well aware of the state’s hostility towards foreign business, but they 
nonetheless hoped to strike a deal with the Soviets and continue business. 
Hoogendijk reported that a regime change would probably not alter much 
in the immediate future, expressing “the hope that a Government monopoly 
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of trade will not be declared after arrival of the Company’s vessel with fresh 
supplies next year” [TNA. BH 1/2629. A92/8/1. F. 69].
Indeed, the need for supplies in the area seemed to have been a major 
incentive for the Soviet government to continue trading in the area. The regime 
change did not alter the needs of the remote settlements and communities. 
A few months after the end of the Civil War, Hoogendijk managed to strike 
a deal with the Soviet authorities, which Moscow ratified on 28 March 1923, 
for the “joint exploitation” of the fur wealth in Kamchatka and the Chukotsk-
Anadirsk region. In contrast, other trading companies, like Swenson (who 
operated after 1922 without Hibbard), were less fortunate and saw their 
possessions confiscated by the Soviet authorities [Swenson, р. 163]. Olaf 
Swenson was even briefly arrested in Vladivostok. The HBC was allowed to 
trade furs during the ice-free season of 1923, calling at a series of trade posts 
along the peninsula. In return, the company promised to ship in supplies to 
the value of $ 350,000 [TNA. BH 1/2629. A 92/8/3. F. 19]. Profits made on fur 
sales had to be shared, however, between the HBC and the Commissariat of 
Foreign Trade (NKVNT). In addition, the local Vneshtorg issued a 10 % tax 
on the total value of the furs collected. It may seem strange that the company 
continued operations at this point. However, the joint monopoly on furs was, 
from a company point of view, perhaps not so undesirable, as competition 
had been identified as one of the major risks to trade in the area, as had 
corruption under the White authorities. At least cooperation with the Soviet 
state now put the HBC in the seemingly comfortable position of monopoly 
supplier and buyer in the area.
Things turned out differently, however. To begin with, the company 
agreed to ship in more supplies during the summer of 1923 (worth $ 119,478 
in addition to the agreed-upon supplies worth $ 350,000) in order to meet the 
wants of the local population. With this, the company hoped that the Soviet 
government would recognize its good intentions [TNA. BH 1/2629. A 92/8/4. 
F. 14]. However, in terms of taxation, things went wrong. According to the 
agreement, the HBC would pay 10 % on the selling price, which amounted 
to $ 48,500. However, the HBC refused to pay, as it was faced with other, 
unexpected tax claims. A surprise demand for 61,300 gold rubles was made 
by the customs house in Chita in November 1923. Other customs houses 
issued similar duties, like the one in Petropavlovsk. The HBC made official 
complaints to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in London, expressing 
that it “was losing faith in the protection of its legal rights in the territory 
of Soviet Russia” [TNA. BH 1/2735. A 92/78/1. F. 8]. Still, the company did 
not intend on giving up. During the winter of 1923–24, preparations were 
made for another summer shipment, again stressing the well-being of the 
local population: “the company is willing to continue the large and difficult 
undertaking already commenced to develop the economic welfare of the 
inhabitants in the Far East” [Ibid. F. 9].
The joint operation with the Soviet authorities never turned into a 
workable solution for the HBC. Despite the attractive trade monopoly, 
the HBC seriously underestimated the hostile attitude towards foreign 
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intruders. In April 1924, local governments further stirred up hostility 
towards the largest international fur business with a press campaign against 
the foreign monopoly, and not much later company assets were arrested in 
Petropavlovsk and other posts. The NKVNT refused to assist the company 
in its problems with local authorities [TNA. BH 1/2629. A 92/8/7. F. 105]. 
In a last attempt to save the Kamchatka concession in 1924, the HBC 
tried to involve ARCOS, the Soviet trade agency in London, in a deal with 
Vneshtorg so as to provide more security for the HBC’s operations. ARCOS, 
however, refused to assist the HBC: “the board of directors of Arcos, are 
opposed to undertaking any obligations or responsibilities in this matter, 
and intimated that they have considerable business… which is conducted 
with far less trouble” [Ibid. F. 11].
Faced by renewed hostility and legal uncertainties, the HBC telegraphed 
Anton Hoogendijk in May 1924, urging him to end the Kamchatka 
expedition as soon as possible. The telegram stated: “in view of constant 
claims making business utterly impossible have decided not to risk any 
more money in Kamchatka even though we should lose greatly through 
this attitude” [TNA. BH 1/2702. A 92/28/2. F. 10]. In July 1924, the HBC’s 
Russian business had come to a complete standstill and the Kamchatka 
business went into liquidation. The last shadowy prospect of doing business 
in Siberia was now gone, and the company counted its losses. Contrary 
to high expectations and despite substantial investments, the Kamchatka 
adventure resulted in a substantial loss for the HBC. By November 1924, 
the company had invested the considerable sum of $ 735,327.07 in the 
stores, infrastructure and supplies of its Kamchatka operation. The HBC’s 
gamble for a fur empire in the Far East had turned out badly.
However, private trading in remote Kamchatka was by no means 
discontinued entirely. The HBC had correctly guessed that the Soviet 
government would continue to need a foreign trading partner in order 
to provide for local communities. Somewhat surprisingly, it was Olaf 
Swenson, the HBC’s Swedish-American competitor, who negotiated a new 
deal, re-entering the area in 1925. Swenson’s vessels shipped in American 
merchandise in accordance with Moscow’s specifications on a cost-plus 
basis in exchange for an assigned quota of furs (also on a cost-plus basis). 
He recalled later in his well-known memoires Northwest of the World that 
“in spite of the financial ruin, and the months of initial difficulty, I have 
no complaint to make against the Soviet government” [Swenson, p. 171]. 
Swenson would continue to operate along the Siberian coast until 1930. 
Only then did the USSR take over the supply system entirely.
*   *   *
The new fur empire in Russia’s Far East was linked to a set of broader 
issues, foremost business strategies and overarching geopolitical 
considerations, and thus did not only derive from a naïve understanding of 
the political risks. At an earlier stage, there was also considerable pressure 
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from the British and, to a lesser extent, Canadian political interests in the 
area that accompanied their military presence, although this connection 
had disappeared by the time the HBC’s presence surged after 1921.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the HBC had again embraced 
a strategy of geographical expansion, which started with the extension 
of trade posts towards the Canadian North: this was done in an attempt 
to avoid the heavy competition in the fur trade present elsewhere in the 
country. The Kamchatka expedition was part of such an expansive strategy, 
complementary to the new trading activities in the Western Arctic. With its 
new geographical ambitions in Canada and abroad, the HBC again tapped 
into the old empire-building mission it had once had as a chartered company. 
In particular, operating in unclaimed (sub)Arctic spaces was predicated on 
a kind of wishful thinking from the traders and companies, who hoped to 
gain the liberty of being able to operate without government interference. 
The HBC jealously observed how American traders operated in the area 
without much Russian state interference, while also noting how easily they 
could establish a business monopoly in the high north. The connection 
between the race to the north in Canada and far eastern expansion is of 
seminal importance in understanding the risks the company took.
Second, connections across the Bering Strait, those between Alaska 
and Siberia and Siberia and Canada, were of growing importance from the 
second half of the nineteenth century. American traders from Nome were 
virtually the sole supplies of communities in Kamchatka, which they did 
in exchange for the territory’s fur wealth. The exchange of furs for supplies 
was a central component of the historical fur trade, and had furnished the 
foundation for trade in the Kamchatka region for decades. Indeed, the HBC 
had estimated correctly that the need for a (foreign) supplier would not 
disappear, regardless of the political allegiance of the Kamchatka Peninsula. 
This primary argument, used extensively by the HBC both internally and 
externally, also formed the basis for the negotiations between the USSR and 
the HBC once White control over the area had come to an end. It even offered 
the prospect of a trade monopoly under Soviet auspices. This assessment 
proved correct, even though it came with legal uncertainty and it was not 
the HBC who ultimately benefited: the American competitor Swenson was 
granted the right to trade in the area once the HBC had abandoned it.
In the end, the closure of the HBC’s trade in the area was largely 
a political decision. The USSR aimed to control foreign trade in its 
territory and heavily taxed the operations of the HBC, deliberately or not. 
The USSR remained largely hostile towards foreign business operating on 
its soil: but it was perhaps harder to tolerate the HBC, which had been an 
imperial driving force, in contested territory, than a smaller American 
trade firm solely devoted to trading in the Far East. However, following 
from the broader framework of the article, the HBC’s failure and heavy 
losses were not only the result of the struggle between the USSR and the 
company itself, but also derived from the internal business strategies. On 
the level of trade competition, the HBC had seriously underestimated 
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the historical capacity of American traders to continue operations in 
Kamchatka in 1921 and 1922. The HBC had underestimated an important 
last element as well, namely the whims of nature. While supplying 
remote territories was the company’s bread and butter, there are strong 
indications that the HBC faced enormous difficulties in providing the 
area with supplies and monopolizing the fur trade in Kamchatka: doing 
so seemed to overstretch the abilities of the HBC. As such, a broader 
perspective reveals that doing business in post-revolutionary Siberia 
was driven by a number of interlocking rationales, business strategies, 
geographical connections, demands and supplies that would continue 
to apply, it was believed, in a radically different political context.
Список литературы
Black J. L. Great Expectations: Revisiting Canadian Economic Footprints in Siberia, 
1890s–1921 // Sibirica : The J. of Siberian Studies. 2013. № 3. P. 1–27.
Bockstoce J. R. White Fox and Icy Seas in the Western Arctic : The Fur Trade, 
Transportation and Change in the Early Twentieth Century. N. Haven : Yale Univ. Press, 
2018. 326 p.
Dalton A. Baychimo: Arctic Ghost Ship. Surrey : Heritage House, 2006. 251 p.
Davenport-Hines R. P. T., Jones G. British Business in Asia since 1860. Cambridge : 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006. 301 p.
Declercq R. Natural Born Merchants : The Hudson Bay Company, Science and Canada’s 
Final Fur Frontiers // Business History. (In print.)
Dunning J., Lundan S. Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. Cheltenham : 
Edward Elgar, 2008. 920 p.
Gray P. The Predicament of Chukotka’s Indigenous Movement : Post-Soviet Activism 
in the Russian Far North. Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005. 245 p.
Hunt W. Alaska : A Bicentennial History. N. Y. : Norton, 1976. 200 p.
McCannon J. Red Arctic : Polar Exploration and the Myth of the North in the Soviet 
Union, 1932–1939. N. Y. : Oxford Univ. Press, 1998. 234 p.
Murby R. Canada’s Siberian Policy 1918–1919 : Thesis Master of Arts Slavonic Studies. 
Vancouver : [S. n.], 1969. 125 p.
Newman P. Merchant Princes. Toronto : Penguin, 1992. 685 p.
Encyclopedia of the Arctic : in 3 Vols. / ed. by M. Nuttal. N. Y. : Routledge, 2004. 
Vol. 1. 695 p.
Ray A. Periodic Shortages, Native Welfare, and the Hudson’s Bay Company 1670– 
1930 // The Subarctic Fur Trade : Native Social and Economic Adaptations / ed. by S. Krech. 
Vancouver : Univ. of British Colombia, 1984. P. 1–21.
Shavit D. The United States in Asia: A Historical Dictionary. N. Y. : Greenwood, 1990. 
620 p.
Swenson O. Northwest of the World. L. : Hale, 1944. 221 p.
TNA. BH 1/2215. A 12FTMISC/250. F. 2–5; BH 1/2603. A 5/129. F. 223; BH 1/2628. 
A 92/8/1. F. 13, 15, 20–21, 24, 33–35, 42, 44, 46, 50, 64, 67; BH 1/2629. A 92/8/1. F. 69; 
A 92/8/3. F. 19; A 92/8/4. F. 14; A 92/8/6. F. 9; A 92/8/7. F. 11, 105; BH 1/2623. A 92/17/6, 
F. 78; BH 1/2633. A 92/17/21. F. 26; BH 1/2634. A 92/17/25 F. 179–184; BH 1/2702. 
A 92/28/2. F. 10; A 92/30/1. F. 4–5, 161; BH 1/2735. A 92/78/1. F. 8–9; BH 1/3452. A 93/12. F. 12.
Wood A. Russia’s Frozen Frontier : A History of Siberia and the Russian Far East 1581–
1991. L. : Bloomsbury, 2011. 272 p.
Yarzutkina A. Trade on the Icy Coasts: The Management of American Traders in the 
Settlements of Chukotka Native Inhabitants // Terra Sebus: Acta Musei Sabesiensis. 2014. 
Special Iss. P. 361–381.
Problema voluminis586
References
Black, J. L. (2013). Great Expectations: Revisiting Canadian Economic Footprints 
in Siberia, 1890s-1921. In The J. of Siberian Studies. No. 3, pp. 1–27.
Bockstoce, J. R. (2018). White Fox and Icy Seas in the Western Arctic: The Fur Trade, 
Transportation and Change in the Early Twentieth Century. N. Haven, Yale Univ. Press. 
326 p.
Dalton, A. (2006). Baychimo: Arctic Ghost Ship. Surrey, Heritage House. 251 p.
Davenport-Hines, R. P. T., Jones, G. (2006). British Business in Asia since 1860. 
Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press. 301 p.
Declercq, R (in print). Natural Born Merchants. The Hudson Bay Company, Science 
and Canada’s Final Fur Frontiers. In Business History.
Dunning, J., Lundan, S. (2008). Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 920 p.
Gray, P. (2005). The Predicament of Chukotka’s Indigenous Movement: Post-Soviet 
Activism in the Russian Far North. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press. 245 p.
Hunt, W (1976). Alaska: A Bicentennial History. N. Y., Norton. 200 p.
McCannon, J. (1998). Red Arctic: Polar Exploration and the Myth of the North in the 
Soviet Union, 1932–1939. N. Y., Oxford Univ. Press. 234 p.
Murby, R. (1969). Canada’s Siberian Policy 1918–1919. Thesis Master of Arts Slavonic 
Studies. Vancouver, S. n. 125 p.
Newman, P. (1992). Merchant Princes. Toronto, Penguin. 685 p.
Nuttal, M. (Ed.). (2004). Encyclopedia of the Arctic. 3 Vols. N. Y., Routledge. Vol. 1. 
695 p.
Ray, A. (1984). Periodic Shortages, Native Welfare, and the Hudson’s Bay Company 
1670–1930. In Krech, S. (Ed.). The Subarctic Fur Trade: Native Social and Economic 
Adaptations. Vancouver, Univ. of British Colombia, pp. 1–21.
Shavit, D. (1990). The United States in Asia: A Historical Dictionary. N. Y., Greenwood. 
620 p.
Swenson, O (1944). Northwest of the World. L., Hale. 221 p.
TNA. BH 1/2215. A 12FTMISC/250. F. 2–5; BH 1/2603. A 5/129. F. 223; BH 1/2628. 
A 92/8/1. F. 13, 15, 20–21, 24, 33–35, 42, 44, 46, 50, 64, 67; BH 1/2629. A 92/8/1. F. 69; 
A 92/8/3. F. 19; A 92/8/4. F. 14; A 92/8/6. F. 9; A 92/8/7. F. 11, 105; BH 1/2623. A 92/17/6, 
F. 78; BH 1/2633. A 92/17/21. F. 26; BH 1/2634. A 92/17/25 F. 179–184; BH 1/2702. A 92/28/2. 
F. 10; A 92/30/1. F. 4–5, 161; BH 1/2735. A 92/78/1. F. 8–9; BH 1/3452. A 93/12. F. 12.
Wood, A. (2011). Russia’s Frozen Frontier: A History of Siberia and the Russian Far 
East 1581–1991. London, Bloomsbury. 272 p.
Yarzutkina, A. (2014). Trade on the Icy Coasts: The Management of American Traders 
in the Settlements of Chukotka Native Inhabitants. In Terra Sebus: Acta Musei Sabesiensis. 
Special Iss., pp. 361–381.
The article was submitted on 21.12.2018
